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DelayThe design and construction industry is moving towards Building Information Models (BIM) that provide all of
the strengths of traditional 3D CAD with an added layer of data allowing new and powerful applications. We in-
vestigate the concept of using the data within BIM to better explore security design and considerations. We
achieve this by ﬁrst graphing the physical entities of BIM to capture their relational representation as nodes
and links. This graph representation will facilitate the use of graph theory or agent-based simulation to assist
in the analysis of the static and dynamic behaviour of the environment around the BIM. We also demonstrate
an application of graphing by investigating the use of BIM to explore automated infrastructure security design
and consideration via red-teaming. The intent is tomake security analysis easier and a process that can be carried
out during the design phase of a project, even by non-expert users.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
Physical Security Assessment is the process of examining a facility
and establishing the risk of it being penetratedwithout detection or ap-
propriate response. To achieve this process one traditionally requires a
security expert, highly valuable individuals whose knowledge and ex-
perience carry a representative cost. This can lead to security consider-
ations becoming almost an afterthought inmany cases, implemented as
needed with experts often consulted late in a project lifecycle.
Researchers have looked at using computer simulation to assist se-
curity practitioners. However, these attempts have often faced prob-
lems with the knowledge required by a user to setup and operate the
software often impeding the usefulness of the system [19]. In this
paper we demonstrate a proof of concept computer aided security sim-
ulation tool designed to alleviate these problems by applying known se-
curity modelling methods and heuristics to the information contained
within a Building Information Model (BIM).GPO Box U1987, Perth, Western
u (S. Porter),
(T. Tan), G.West@Curtin.edu.au
V. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA liceBIM is a 3D modelling paradigm that extends the capabilities of
“dumb”modelling applications like traditional 3D Computer Aided De-
sign (CAD) by adding a layer of associated information. By leveraging
this information layer it is possible to perform deeper analysis of a facil-
ity, such as simulating elements like construction cost and time. In our
research we look to provide tools that open up Physical Security as a
simulation option.
In this article we will discuss some of the advantages of BIM and
existing research on Security Simulation. We will then introduce the
process we use to go from BIM to simulation, followed by the static
and dynamic simulation applicationswe have developed to date. Finally
wewill present the results of ourwork and discusswherewe see it lead-
ing in the future.
2. Background
In this section we will address, in part, the history of BIM and Infra-
structure Security.Wewill also discuss some of the background of Intel-
ligent Agents, which can be used to further explore the models we
create.
2.1. Background—BIM
BIM is an evolving standard for the collaboration and design of facil-
ities. We are increasingly seeing its uptake, with many multi-million
dollar projects utilising it [7]. In Australia, the federal and state govern-
ments are increasingly requiring the use of BIM for public worksnse.
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advantage of its potential.
A common advantage of BIM over traditional CAD is that BIM can
perform automatic conﬂict detection, saving time and money during
the design stage. However, Gao and Fischer [7] found only 14 of the
32 projects they examined took advantage of this feature. Azhar et al.
[2] demonstrated that the returns on investment for BIM from activities
such as automatic collision detection are well worth the cost to
organisations.
Cheng & Wang [3] discussed how BIM allows for any changes that
need to be made to be implemented more cheaply than in traditional
3D CAD or 2D designmethods. One example of this is moving a support
beam; in traditional CAD a designer typically needs to move the beam,
then any supports, bolts and foundation individually. In BIM these ob-
jects can all be grouped, allowing the software to move the associated
components with the beam, saving the designer time and effort.
BIM is not without criticism, though this criticism typically liesmore
with the implementations than the concept. Coates et al. [4] stated “BIM
represents the digital Lego, not the digital clay” referring in part to the
inﬂexibility of current software to accommodate different designmeth-
odologies. In their paper, they comment that BIM currently has no real
support for free form sketching and other early design techniques. Al-
ternatives are suggested, such as Onuma Planning System, though as
BIM continues to mature we will most likely see software vendors at-
tempt to address these issues.
Smith [17] found a great deal of power in the ability of BIM to help
plan and design a facility. They suggested that by better planning how
a facility will be used, ensuring loud machinery is away from quiet
work areas and so on, the efﬁciency of a facility can be increased. They
go on to state that if the efﬁciency of a facility can be improved as little
as 3.8%, that improvementwill pay for the entire facility over its lifetime.
As BIM becomes widely accepted in architectural business, provid-
ing tools that make it quick and easy for an architect to receive feedback
on their design and bring their attention to areas they may want to ad-
just will allow for cheap and effective modiﬁcations. By building on
existing BIM software we intend to make security analysis another
tool at the designer's disposal, allowing for easy early consideration
and changes to help improve facility integrity. Our tools will not replaceFig. 1. A simple BIM represented in 3security experts but we aim tomake some of their knowledge easily ac-
cessible, to allow for earlier incorporation of security considerations
during the vital design phases when change is easiest to bring about.
2.2. Background—Infrastructure Security
Infrastructure Security is an expansive ﬁeld in its own right, so here
we will look primarily at areas that have inﬂuenced our own work. We
will ﬁrst address existing infrastructure security simulation systems.
After this, we will provide some background on the security heuristics
we have elected to use.
Tarr and Peaty [19–21] examined the use of computational model-
ling of security. Their approach examined the use of modelling to assist
in the design of prison facilities. To achieve this, a simulation would be
setup bymodelling all barriers along a given pathwith relative material
strength, which was then analysed to establish if it provided sufﬁcient
Delay and Detection.
They found computer-aided simulation to be a beneﬁcial approach,
with one of the main limitations being the need for expert users to
input data and setup the simulation. A lot of their effort between their
original publication and the last was spent on reﬁning the tools to re-
duce the cost of modelling a facility, but as of last publication it was
still a problem. With our system, we have successfully minimised the
negative impact of these problems through leveraging BIM.
Others have also used BIM for facility analysis with some also
analysing security concerns. In Automated Assessment of Early Concept
Designs [6], the author describes the work undertaken by their team to
create an extension of the Solibri Model Checker. Their extension is
reminiscent of an expert system, assessing the BIM design for conformi-
ty to various regulations and providing feedback to the designer, reduc-
ing the knowledge burden on designers less experienced in dealing
with Courthouse design.
Garcia [8] described the EASI model, which allows an expert user to
calculate the delay along a single path through a facility. Similar to the
work by Tarr and Peaty [21], both the reliance on an expert user and
the single path calculation can make this process slow and costly. A
point of concern for us is that single path modelling presented in the
above systems may lead to the oversight of exploitable attack vectors.D, with the front wall selected.
Fig. 2. BIM to graph transformation.
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creasing their knowledge burden.
To assist in this, we currently use security heuristics based on the
work by Alach [1]. Alach used a survey of security experts, academics
and students to establish the likely delay matrix for a combination of
materials and attacks. While the matrix provides a limited cross-
section of all possible materials and attacks, it gives us a good starting
basis.
To allow for future adaptability, we have made our system extensi-
ble, using extendible Markup Language (XML) formatting, a format
that is machine and human readable, for material and attack input so
that the system can easily be updated with a users preferred heuristics.
The system currently uses a fairly simple name matching system to as-
sign attributes from the XML ﬁles to thematerials foundwithin the BIM.
Once these attributes are assigned, we can then perform a security anal-
ysis across the facility.
2.3. Background—Agent based simulation
“The agent can be deﬁned an XML form that can be viewed as per-
ceiving its environment through sensors and acting upon that environ-
ment through actuators” [16]. A multi-agent system is simply an
environment that contains more than one agent.
In amulti-agent system, groups of agents interact with each other to
achieve some goals. The agent's individual goal may or may not be
aligned with the group's goal.
The agents have a limited perception and knowledge of the world.
Consider that if each agent was to have a complete knowledge of the
world, then the behaviour of the system would be akin to a centralized
decision maker working through the lower level actuators and sensors
[15].
There are several applications that have shown the beneﬁts of using
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). Industrial applications were developed as
early as 1987 in areas including process control, manufacturing
and many other areas [10]. In defence, MAS has been used in military
simulations [14,13] and simulating cyberattacks on critical infrastruc-
ture [12]. This paper introduces the ﬁrst MAS implementation on BIM
for physical security assessment.
3. Method
3.1. BIM to graph
Graph theory is a well studied area in Computer Science and has
been used for some time to explore spatial navigation problems. An ex-
ample of some early work in graph-analysis is presented by Grason [9],
who discusses a system formodelling a building as a graph. As might beexpected from early works dealing with computer models, it was limit-
ed by the resources available, such as requirements to describe the facil-
ity via simple geometry as part of the program.
This is where we and others have found information rich systems
such as BIM useful as a basis for graph analysis. Converting a BIM to a
graph allows us to take advantage of the knowledge base on graph the-
ory to efﬁciently explore the problem domain. But to make use of this
knowledge base, we ﬁrst need to extrapolate a graph model from the
BIM, a process which we will describe below.
A graph is made up of nodes connected by edges. For security model-
ling we represent areas or zones, such as rooms, within an environment
as the nodes. The edges between the nodes represent the possible
paths, with values given to the edges to indicate the cost of that path.
Within our modelling, the cost is typically the delay associated with a
given path.
In Fig. 2 below, we can see a simpliﬁed example, with only a single
edge between any two nodes. Nodes will frequently have multiple
edges connecting them; doors, walls and windows all provide possible
paths between areas. To successfully graph the BIM we must identify
all valid paths and generate matching edges, creating a complete
graph model of the BIM.(See Fig. 1.)
From early exploration of the graph conversion problem, it was decid-
ed that generating nodes from raw bounding data from walls would
prove too complex and unreliable process. Working within Revit,
Autodesk's BIM authoring solution, we used the Rooms tool to deﬁne
the areas within a given BIM, taking advantage of the tools intelligence
to ensure all areas of interest are labelled. Using the rooms as a basis for
our analysis allowed us to search for objects interacting with the
bounding box of a given area, reducing our search space and simplifying
the problem.
Once the nodes are deﬁned, we then establish the edges between
them. As mentioned, potentially any physical link between two areas
can provide a path, so we must generate edges corresponding to all
walls, doors, windows and even ﬂoors and ceilings. In the case of
walls, doors and windows, the process is quite repetitive, so we will
present here the method for mapping walls, with other paths being
quite similar in implementation.
For each area, we search through all available walls looking for those
that intersect the boundary. When such a wall is found, we then search
through all other valid areas to test for any that also border thewall and
thus are likely to be linked. Due to the inaccuracies of using bounding
boxes for this process, we need to check if we are not matching across
a corner. But if the two zones pass the necessary checks, we create the
edge, as can be seen on the top of Fig. 3.
In cases where no linked area can be found, we instead create an
edge linking to the “outer” zone. These are not shown in Fig. 3 to reduce
visual complexity. The outer zone is used to represent theworld outside
Fig. 3.Blue nodes represent groundﬂoor zones, green nodes representﬁrst ﬂoor zones. On the top,we have the graph laid outwithout any vertical links. On the bottomwe have added the
vertical links.
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Fig. 4. Path analysis example: Select cost for each barrier, compare costs to establish cheapest path, assign path and value to Room1.
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cess is completed for walls, we repeat it for all other horizontal edges,
giving us a level-by-level graph representation.
Floors and ceilings are a slightly different process. Because they ex-
tend horizontally across multiple zones, we need to use a few different
metrics to ensure correct association. Firstly, we go through and estab-
lish theboundary heights for eachﬂoor of the facility, creating amapped
list of the number of ﬂoors and their boundaries. Then for each ﬂoor or
ceiling, we go through each zone and establish the midpoint to test if
that falls within the boundaries. If it is within the bounding area, we
then check to see if the height of the ceiling or ﬂoor would place it adja-
cent to the zone.
Similar to the process for generating wall edges, we then search
through all zones on the level above to identify vertical neighbours.
When a neighbour is identiﬁed, we create a link between them, as
seen on the bottom of Fig. 3. For the top-most and bottom-most levels,
when no neighbour can be found, we again create a link to the outer
zone.
We now have a 3D graph of the facility, taking into account most
horizontal and vertical links. The ﬁnal step is to create the edges
representing vertical transport, such as elevators or stairs. Aswe consid-
er the cost to travel a single ﬂoor a subset of the cost to travel a set of
ﬂoors, we create edges only between neighbouring ﬂoors. From a
graphing point of view, this greatly reduces the number of edges
while still accurately capturing the available paths.
For instance, it is functionally the same in terms of cost when tra-
versing the graph to move from stairwell level one, to stairwell level
two, to stairwell level three as it would be to travel from stairwellFig. 5. RAC_Advanced_samplevel one to stairwell level three. By linking level by level we reduce
the computational complexity of the graph with no real loss of ﬁdelity.
3.2. Modelling security—Static analysis
Security can be considered from theprinciples of the threeDs; Delay,
Detect and Detain. Delay represents the time for an attacker to reach
their goal and escape, Detect the probability that theywill be discovered
along the way and Detain the probability of intercepting them in time.
To date, we have been modelling Delay and will discuss below our
method for doing so.
We should note that we do not, at present, address the problem of
delay due to movement within a room, such as an attacker walking or
running. This is due to the complexity of such calculations and unfortu-
nately may not be addressed within the scope of our current research. If
time was to allow, we would most likely look at incorporating a model
based upon or similar to the Universal Circulation Network (UCN)[11].
UCN attempts to capturemore realistic humanmovement within an
environment, rather than simple central linemethodswhere a person is
expected to take the most direct route. While for security modelling, a
human-like best case navigation would probably give a good indication
of Delay effectiveness, it would also be interesting to extend their work.
Given time,we could research incorporating attacker familiaritywith an
area, object clutter and attacker mobility impediment from tool load.
It would also be interesting for larger facilities to incorporate a lay-
ered route graph system similar to the work done by Werner et al.
[22]. This could allow for ﬂuid assessment of attackermovementwithin
a facility and also attack routes that are applicable to reach an area by carle_project shown in 3D.
Table 1
Tool set labels.
Tool set Tools in the set
6 Explosive, electric drill, oxy cutting, axe
5 Electric drill, oxy cutting, axe, hammer, rock
4 Oxy cutting, axe, hammer, rock
3 Axe, hammer, rock
2 Hammer, rock
1 Rock
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analysis without this added delay information.
Given the graph generated in Section 3.1, we have a computational
searchable representation of a facility. We now assign the edges with
appropriate costs, representing the delay involved along a given link.
To do so, we consider how an attacker might exploit a given edge by
referencing the work by Alach [1]. To make the simulation process as
user extensible as possible, the tools and materials are loaded from an
XML ﬁle.
The XML ﬁle contains a breakdown of all available tools/attack
methods. It then lists each material and within that material, a lists of
all valid attacks. For each valid attack, an average breach time is record-
ed in the XML, for use during security simulation.
To perform a security simulationwe assign a set of tools to an attack-
er; such as rock, hammer and explosive. Then, as the graph is generated,
we cross reference the assigned tools against the material(s) within a
barrier and a link is made between zones using the average breach
time(s). In the case of non-material edges, such as stairs, an arbitrary
cost value is assigned.
The reasonwe use an arbitrary value for travel barriers such as stairs
is the complexity of properly calculating an actual travel time. The
weight of equipment being carried, ﬁtness of an attacker and other fac-
tors would affect the actual time.We hope that more complex and real-
istic values can be integrated in the future.
Once all edge costs are assigned,we perform a greedy search. This al-
gorithm traverses the graph, starting from the outer zone node with a
delay of 0. It ﬁnds the cheapest path to each linked node from the
outer zone and assigns that value to the destination node, as demon-
strated in Fig. 4.
The search algorithm then processes each node in sequence, exam-
ining its neighbours and adding the lowest link between the neighbours
and target node to establish the cheapest path. If this path is cheaper or
the node is not yet assigned, it is updated with this value and informa-
tion on the neighbour responsible. Once it has processed all nodes, the
algorithm will repeat the process to allow for changes in cost as nodes
are updated. It will continue to iterate over the list of nodes until no fur-
ther changes occur, indicating that the lowest cost to each node has
been established.
The above process represents a single simulation run, allowing us
to examine the delay to any point in the facility for a given set of
tools. To establish common weak points within a facility, the system
can perform a comprehensive set of simulations for all combinations
of a set of tools. After each individual run, the graph state is saved
along with the tools used to reach its stored values. After the ﬁnal
run, a statistical analysis across all states can be conducted,
highlighting average delay for each zone and the deviation caused
by each tool (see Section 4.1).Table 2
Detailed log of attack from Outer to Admin 126 using Tool set 6.
Time delay (min) Current zone Tool used
0.07 Outer Rock
0.07 Conference 123 Explosive
0.07 Corridor 131 Explosive3.3. Modelling security—Dynamic analysis
The agent-based simulation is developed using the Java Agent De-
velopment (JADE) framework for the Multi Agent System and Java Uni-
versal Network/Graph (JUNG) framework for the graph representation
and visualisation. The simulation uses a hotel model shown in Fig. 5.
The agents are divided into two teams: red team and blue team. The
red team attacks the facility, while the blue team defends the facility.
The red team consists of Red Leader and Red Member, while the blue
team consists of Blue Leader and Builder. The toolset is the set of tools
available to the agent and are labelled as shown in Table 1. At ﬁrst,
Red Member attacks the facility with a full set of six tools. In each sub-
sequent round, RedMember attacks with one less tool. So instead of ex-
ploring all possible combinations, we simulate a range of attacks: froma
fully equipped attacker to a minimally equipped attacker. This reduces
the computational complexity but still allows an assessment of toolset's
impact on security.
At the start, the Red Leader instructs the Red Member to begin the
ﬁrst attack iteration. The instruction contains the attack parameters
which are the set of tools, the starting point and the targeted zone, e.g.
“Given a hammer and a rock and starting from outside the building, at-
tack the zone labelled Admin 126”. Red Member then computes the
shortest path based onDijkstra's shortest path algorithm [5] by compar-
ing the best tool to use and thus the optimum path to take.
Once a room is breached, the RedMember records the time and path
taken as well as tools used. An example of this report is shown in
Table 2. The Red Member starts again from outside the facility and
breaks into the next room and repeats until all rooms are breached.
Next, the RedMember repeats the attack with a different set of tools
and submits a ﬁnal report to the Red Leader. Table 3 shows the time
delay for four selected rooms from the 93 rooms available. An operator
can conclude that a fully equipped attacker can breach Library 219 in
0.28 min whereas a less equipped attacker would take between 4.66
and 22.22 min to breach the same room.
Once the Red Member submits a ﬁnal report to the Red Leader, this
concludes the attacking round. The report is then submitted to the Blue
Leader for further action. This mimics how a red versus blue team sce-
nario would have been conducted.
Now, the Blue team learns from the experience and attempts to
harden the facility. By analysing the attack patterns in the report, the
Blue Leader instructs the Builder to upgrade a barrier, for example
upgrading a door from ‘as strong as wood’ to ‘as strong as brick’. The up-
grade strategy for this simulation chooses to upgrade the most fre-
quently used access point ﬁrst and if it has reached a maximum, it
upgrades the next most frequently used point of entry and so on.
Once upgrade is completed, the Builder reports back to the Blue
Leader that a barrier has been successfully upgraded. Then, the Blue
Leader informs the Red Leader that the facility has been hardened and
requests the Red Leader to attack again. This concludes Blue Team's de-
fence iteration. The simulation runs for 100 iterations of attack and de-
fence cycle. The complete simulation takes 20 s to execute on an 8 Gb
1333 MHz DDR3 2.4 GHz Intel Core i7 MacBook Pro.
Three visualisation views were developed to assist the operator in
evaluating the security of the facility. The ﬁrst view divides the nodes
(zones) and edges (barriers) into three equal number groups coloured
red (least secure), yellow and green (most secure) as shown in Fig. 6.
The width of the edge represents the frequency of that path taken.Material Barrier breached Next zone
Glass Window 4 Conference 123
Wood Door 23 Corridor 131
Wood Door 27 Admin 126
Table 3
Total delay time for selected rooms and tool set.
Tool set Instruction 315 (min) Library 219 (min) Lobby 102 (min) Lobby 216 (min)
6 0.60 0.28 0.14 0.21
5 8.52 4.66 3.06 3.13
4 14.44 9.52 6.3 6.37
3 17.78 12.89 9.64 9.71
2 18.30 13.41 9.64 9.71
1 30 22.22 15.42 15.49
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grade changes the path taken by the attacker.
The second visualisation as shown in Fig. 7 is similar to the ﬁrst ex-
cept the threshold is deﬁned by the user instead of the system dividing
the graph into three equal parts. This is useful for security audits where
there are minimum requirements andwhere the simulation can imme-
diately highlight zones which pass or fail those requirements. The third
view shows the path taken by the attacker from outside the facility to a
speciﬁed zone as shown in Fig. 8. This is useful when a speciﬁc zone is of
higher interest and the operator wants to view the attack path taken.
During the simulation, the attack vector changes in real time to reﬂect
the attacker's responses to the blue team defending actions.
3.4. Results—Static analysis
For our development and testing, we created a simple BIM involving
two levels of symmetrical rooms. On each ﬂoor we created a three by
three grid of rooms, as shown in Fig. 9. We placed a staircase in the bot-
tom right corner of the grid to link the two ﬂoors and used fairly basic
materials throughout.
We numbered the rooms based on grid co-ordinates in the form of
level, Column and Row. We begin this numbering from ﬂoor 0 for theFig. 6. Graph's heat map to show thground ﬂoor, with the top left room designated as column 1 and row
1. So in Fig. 9, we see the top ﬂoor of the simple matrix BIM, where
the top left would be denoted as Room 111 and the bottom right
would be denoted as 133.
Initial simulations produced the results shown in Figs. 10, 11, 12 and
13. The results shown are from a comprehensive analysis of the facility.
The different combinations of tools determine the number of simula-
tions. In this case, the tools allow for 63 combinations, giving us a
value of 63 for N.
“Number of times facility is likely to be breached via this zone” indi-
cates the number of times that the neighbour used to access the zone is
the outer zone. In other words, the number of times it was fastest to ac-
cess the room directly from outside. Rooms with particularly high
breach counts are commonly used for access, indicating some kind of
weakness to the attack set used that should be investigated.
As we can see in Fig. 10 above, for almost half of the simulations
many of the rooms on the ground ﬂoor are at risk of being a breach
point. These numbers correlate with the runs involving explosives,
which have a tendency to heavily weigh the results due to its extremely
low time to breach any material. As we would expect, only the lobby
which has a door to the outside is used as a breach point in all runs;
doors representing a far more exploitable path than a wall.e security levels of the zones.
Fig. 7. User can deﬁne the thresholds of the heat map.
Fig. 8. Shows the shortest path from the starting location to the targeted zone.
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Fig. 9. A simple 3 × 3 matrix BIM of a single ﬂoor.
Fig. 11. Average delay to each zone and the standard deviation.
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ness, allowing a designer to easily examine the commonpoints of attack
and improve them, thus improving the overall security of the facility.
For instance, in our simple matrix, we can see from the number of
breaches that Lobby, bottom centre in Fig. 9, is a common entry point.
Any improvements to the security of this zone will thus have a trickle
on effect to the rest of the facility.
“Average security by zone” presents the average delay value for each
zone across the runs; the time to reach a given zone. A sample output of
these values can be seen in Fig. 11. As can be seen from the results, the
standard deviation is extremely high due to the runs involving explo-
sives. These results are intended to express clearly the likely delay to
high value zones, allowing easy evaluation of delay versus response time.
Finally, the system provides the “Average security by tool”, breaking
down the information for each tool, to allow users to detect attacks they
are particularly vulnerable to and attempt to harden a facility against
this. The results of this can be seen in Fig. 11. We can see clearly from
the maximum delay average that explosives severely limit the security
of the given facility, with minimum delay not currently used.
The results shown in Fig. 13 are from a run against the
“rac_advanced_sample_project” (Figs. 5 & 14) that is included as part
of the Revit 2012 distribution. To make the project compatible with
our toolset some minor changes were necessary, primarily the addition
of a few missing zones from hallways to allow proper linking. Place-
holders were also added to our material list to allow for matching
with materials we did not otherwise have metrics for.
As can be seen from the results, our system is able to deal withmore
elaboratemodels as long as some concessions are taken by the designer,
such as appropriate naming and rooms throughout. Given theseFig. 10. First ﬂoor breach data for Matrix model.considerations, Cerberus is able to leverage the information within a
BIM to provide user readable feedback on the relative security of areas
within a facility.3.5. Results—Agent based analysis
Table 4 shows the number of zones breached in the “rac_advanced_
sample_project”model within a certain time. The simulation ends after
100 iterations. In each iteration, Red Team attempts to breach every
zone and subsequently Blue Team attempts to harden the facility's de-
fences. The ﬁrst iteration is labelled as “Before” and the 100th iteration
is labelled “After”. The number of zones breached in less than 5 min
has reduced by 13 zones. Before the simulation, nine zones were
breached only after 15 min. After the simulation has ended, this has in-
creased to 53 zones (shown in bold in Table 4).
At the end of the simulation, the zone with the least delay is Copy/
Print 228 (0.64 min) while the zone with highest delay is Women 308
(26.15 min). The average delay for all zones is 15.12 min. The zone
which has a similar delay time to the average is Instruction 117
(15.82 min). Fig. 15 shows the gradual increase in the time delay for
the zones: Copy/Print 228, Instruction 117, Women 308 and the overall
average for all zones.
The Copy/Print 228 zone has lower security because it is theﬁrst entry
point from Outer whereas Women 308 zone has higher security because
it is on the third ﬂoor and separated by infrequently accessed doors.4. Discussion and recommendation
Weview ourwork to date as a proof of concept; developing a frame-
work of BIM interrogation and security analysis that can be extended in
future work. As our framework matures we anticipate better access to
data and more uses for the data we have access to. We will discuss
some of the frameworks current shortcomings and future research pos-
sibilities below.Fig. 12. Average delay broken down by tool for the Matrix model.
Fig. 13. Excerpt of average security by zone output for rac_advanced_sample_project.
93S. Porter et al. / Automation in Construction 40 (2014) 84–95An item we would like to see investigated in the future is security-
costing estimation. This would allow designers to weigh the cost and
beneﬁts of changes they make to security layouts across a facility. CostFig. 14. The entry-level ﬂoorplan forestimation is already in use within industry for BIM with regard to ma-
terials [2], and appropriate models for estimating security implementa-
tion would need to be identiﬁed.RAC_Advanced_sample_project.
Table 4
Number of zones breached within time delay.
Delay time (min) Before After
t b 5 18 5
5 b = t b10 20 13
10 b = t b15 45 21
15 b = t b20 9 30
t N = 20 0 23
94 S. Porter et al. / Automation in Construction 40 (2014) 84–95There is also potential for using MAS for carbon footprint optimisa-
tion. While carbon impact analysis has already been performed on
BIM [18] previously, we believe that usingMAS to analyse and optimise
material selection would be a novel application. Using an expanded
framework to export information on wall location and material would
make it easy for a MAS to utilise a database and compare for carbon im-
pact of materials as constructed and during lifecycle; similar to the cur-
rent process for facility hardening.
We are also aware that at present we don't take advantage of all po-
tential information within a BIM with security ramiﬁcations, such as
walking distance and sightlines. In future we would like to identify
and incorporate models for sightlines as well as sound propagation, to
enable high ﬁdelity detection modelling. To improve delay modelling,
as discussed in Section 3.2, we would also like to incorporate a move-
ment modelling system and have already identiﬁed some candidates.
It will also be important to expand our materials database and begin
building a database of objects such as locks and sensors.
The inclusion of sensor detection simulation will also lead to inter-
esting opportunities for the MAS approach. Modelling sensor locations
will allow us to perform simulations where attackers must not just
reach a destination, but do so undetected, highlighting weak paths. Ide-
ally future iterationswould include the ability to have theMAS simulate
and recommend best placement for a given set of sensors.
The agent based results show that the BIM can be analysed using a
MAS approach. The use of red–blue team is based on simulations inmil-
itary operations [14]. This approach has not been attempted before
using BIMs.
By using a MAS approach, different roles can be developed to pro-
vide decision support for the security consultant evaluating a particular
facility. A security consultant canmap different tasks to different agents
to analyse a BIM. For example an agent canmonitor and analyse the cost
impact of each upgrade in each round.
Security analysis can be further improved by including weights to
represent the value of each zone. For example a bank vault would
have a higher weight than themen's toilet because it is more important.
In future, sensors can be included in the model to simulate detection in
addition to the delay aspect.
Other than including additional features in the model, the MAS ap-
proach itself can be further improved. One improvementwould be to in-
troduce a Blue Member that would either guard a ﬁxed position or0
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Fig. 15. Time delay for selected zones over number of iterations based on the
rac_advanced_sample_project model.patrol selected zones. In future studies, the software can be improved
to includemultiple Red Members attacking a facility and likewise, mul-
tiple Blue Members defending the facility.
5. Conclusion
BIM provides an information richmodel, which can be used through-
out the lifecycle of a facility, from design through to operation and even
decommissioning. Likemany things, what you get out of BIMdepends on
what you put in and organisations that invest the resources in themodel
will see greater long-term gains. These gains are increasingly driving the
design and facility management industries towards BIM, with adoption
and innovation within BIM increasing continually.
By building on the basis of BIM, we cannot only add value to those
organisations already adopting its use, but we can take advantage of
its information layer. This allows us to easily access data necessary to
abstract a graph representation of a facility and model its security dy-
namics. As demonstrated, this allows us to cheaply analyse a facility
and provide feedback to the user on the relative security of each zone.
We can then take the generated graph and run agent-based simula-
tion against it. As shown, agent-based analysis can assist in both analysis
and design of the facility. This allows for the expedient exploration of a
complex matrix of needs and wants, aiding the user in ﬁnding their
ideal balance.
By providing tools that are easy to use, we intend to facilitate a shift
in thinking, allowing security to be considered and incorporated from
an early stage, enabling better decisions earlier. We have shown a static
and dynamic approach to assess physical security that requires less
technical and security expertise than previous work, with minimal
cost to implement for an enduser.Wehave established a strong founda-
tion for our future work and demonstrated that these tools can provide
powerful analysis to support decisions.
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